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Abstract 
 
This dissertation was written as part of the LLM in Transnational and European  Commercial Law, 
Mediation, Arbitration and Banking Law at the International Hellenic University. 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a comprehensive analysis and examine the general condi-
tions for imposing administrative fines in the context of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 «on the protec-
tion of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data». Chapter 1 refers to the general framework and further assessment criteria which the 
Supervisory Authority take into account in the fining procedure and the different levels of adminis-
trative fines provided for by GDPR for different infringements of its provisions . Reference is also 
made to the principles of specificity and predictability that should be govern the procedure for the 
imposition of fines Chapter 2 refers to recipients of the administrative sanctions and the procedure 
taken place for imposing the fines.  
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Prof. Komninos Komnios for assisting 
my dissertation. His expertise, understanding and patience were really helpful for me in any stage 
of my research. I would like to thank him for his continuous support, motivation, his immediate 
response to my questions and his valuable guidance. 
In parallel, I would also like to thank all the teaching staff of the LL.M in Transnational and Europe-
an Commercial Law, Mediation, Arbitration and Banking Law of International Hellenic University 
for their help and support, which was a motivation for me to advance my knowledge. 
I would also like to give special thanks to my family and my friends, for their support and encour-
agement during my post-graduate studies. 
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Preface 
 
The rules of the Directive 95/46/EU «on the protection of individuals with regard to «the pro-
cessing of personal data and on the free movement of such data» were not directly applicable but 
had to be implemented by the Member States into their national data protection law. The different 
application of rules by Member States resulted in great divergences among the different data pro-
tection regimes that shake the desired legal certainty in the field of data protection law. The need 
for a strong legal regime which it could harmonize the different Member States legislation lead to 
the drafting of the new General Data Protection Regulation which strengthen the level of protec-
tion of rights and interests of data subjects and enhance the legal certainty in the field of data pro-
tection law. 
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Introduction 
 
The rapid pace of technological developments and globalization has resulted in dramatic changes 
for collecting, processing, exchanging and using personal data. The almost unlimited technical 
possibilities of using and commercializing personal data and the growing importance and value of 
personal data for businesses on the one hand require a strong regime for protecting personal data 
on the other1. The need for further harmonization and a greater level of protection of fundamental 
rights in the field of data protection law, led the European legislator to adopt the General Data 
Protection Regulation (hereafter, the ΄΄GDPR΄΄)2 . The GDPR became effective on May, 28, 2018, 
and is directly applicable into the domestic legislation of the Member States.3 However, the 
introduction of a few opening clauses which allow the Member States to adopt further national 
laws and to impose further specifications on particular topics, restrain the full harmonization of 
data protection regime within the Union. The transition from the legal status of the Directive 
95/46/EU to that of GDPR, also brought changes to the mechanisms of enforcement of the new 
law. The GDPR adopting the model of European law on free competition has introduced an 
autonomous and effective administrative fining system in order to consolidate the uniform 
application of the substantive provisions of the GDPR throughout the European Union. 
The Directive 95/46/EU already contained a provision which required Member States to «adopt 
suitable measures to ensure the full implementation of the above Directive and lay down the 
sanctions to be imposed in case of infringement of the provisions adopted pursuant to this 
Directive»4.However, the general wording of the provision and its failure to specify precisely the 
                                               
1 Rucher D./Kugler T., «New European General Data Protection Regulation: A Practitioner’s Guide 
Ensuring Compliant Corporate Practice. » C.H BECK HART NOMOS, (2018), 1-3. 
2 The data protection law under the previous data protection Directive 95/46/EU and its various 
national implementations was fragmented across Europe. Given that the common rules provided 
for by the Directive were not directly applicable but need to be implemented by the Member 
States into their national data protection laws  the implementation in practice resulted to 
significant divergences in the national interpretation and application of data protection rules and 
therefore  in the level of protection throughout the Union. 
3 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 Of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data and repealing Directive 95/46/EC. 
4 Article 24 of Directive 95/46/EU. 
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type and intensity of sanctions, left a wide discretion to Member States when deciding the 
imposition and the amount of administrative fines. The discrepancies in the sanctioning system, 
which are rather attributable to the differences in the criminal and administrative law of Member 
States, lead in some cases to the lack of legitimacy of the competent Supervisory Authority to 
impose administrative fines or its impossibility to enforce the sanctions imposed.5 
In order to address the differences in the field of the sanctioning system for breaches of EU 
legislation as well as to ensure an effective protection of personal data throughout the Union and a 
consistent monitoring of the processing of personal data in the internal market, the GDPR 
introduces a system of equivalent sanctions in all Member States 6. The consistent application of 
the fining practice throughout the EU is ensured through the consistency mechanism7. The 
doctrine of equivalence is central in determining the extent of the obligations of the supervisory 
authorities to ensure consistency in their use of corrective powers according to  article 58 (2)  in 
general and the application of administrative fines in particular8. The system should also have 
preventive-dissuasive function enhancing thereby the enforcement of the GDPR rules. 
The article 83 specifies the sanctioning power of the supervisory authorities provided for in article 
58 (2) (i). An important tool for the supervisory authorities in regard to application and setting of 
administrative fines are the guidelines of the Article 29 Working Party9 published on 3 October 
                                               
5 The enforceability of the act of the Data Protection Authority is explicitly provided for in Article 
21 para 2 of Law 2472/1997. 
6 Recital 11 and 13 of GDPR. 
7 Article 63 states that: « In order to contribute to the consistent application of this Regulation 
throughout the Union, the supervisory authorities shall cooperate with each other and, where 
relevant, with the Commission, through the consistency mechanism as set out in this Section». The 
consistency mechanism in GDPR is outlined as a means to the consistent appliance of the GDPR in 
all Member States by obliging the supervisory authorities to cooperate with each other and with 
the Commission. The main instrument to ensure a consistent appliance of the GDPR is the 
establishment of the Board (art.68 para1) which replaces the Art.29 Working Party. 
8 Recital 150  states that: «the consistency mechanism may also be used to promote a consistent 
application of administrative fees». 
9 The Working Party was set up under Article 29 of Directive 95/46/EC. It is an independent 
European advisory body on data protection and privacy and consists of the European Data 
Protection Supervisor, EC (representatives) and EU Member State representatives. Its tasks are 
described in Article 30 of the Directive 95/46/EU and Article 15 of Directive 2002/58/EU. 
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2017 (the Guidelines). The guidelines provide an insight into how supervisory authorities will 
determine whether an administrative fine must be imposed under the GDPR. Their use by the 
supervisory authorities ensure a better application and enforcement of the GDPR and expresses 
their common understanding of the provisions of Article 83 of the GDPR as well as its interplay 
with articles 58 and 70 and their corresponding recitals 10 The EDPB, with a view of achieving a 
consistent approach to the imposition of the administrative fines has agreed on a common 
understanding of the assessment criteria in article 83 (2) and therefore the guidelines are used as a 
common approach by the EDPB and individual supervisory authorities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
10 According to article 70 (1), (f): Τhe European Data Protection Board (hereafter ΄΄EDPB΄΄) is 
empowered to issue guidelines, recommendations and best practices in order to encourage 
consistent application of GDPR and article 70 (1), (k) specifies the provision for guidelines regarding 
the setting of administrative fines. 
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Chapter 1. The substantive provisions relating administrative fines 
 
1.1 Article 83 para 1 
 
 From a business point of view, administrative fines constitute one of the most controversial 
issues of the GDPR since fines can easily amount to millions of euros. Article 83 establishes a 
differentiated and flexible system with regard to the imposition of administrative fines which   
entitles directly the supervisory authorities for imposing administrative fines, without, in principle 
to give leeway to national legislators11.   
Like all corrective measures in general, administrative fines should adequately respond to the 
nature, gravity and consequences of the breach and supervisory authorities must assess all the 
facts of the case in a manner that is consistent and objectively justified. Article 83 para 1, lays 
down the general framework regarding the imposition of   administrative fines providing that: 
«Each supervisory authority shall ensure that the imposition of administrative fines pursuant to this 
Article in respect of infringements of this Regulation … shall in each individual case be effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive». The guidelines of Article 29 Working Party determine that the 
‘’assessment of what is effective, proportional and dissuasive in each case will have to also reflect 
the objective pursued by the administrative fine that is either to reestablish compliance with the 
rules or to punish unlawful behavior (or both). Also, they recognize that national legislator may set 
additional requirements on the enforcement procedure to be followed by the supervisory 
authorities. However, such requirements should not hamper in practice the achievement of 
effectiveness, proportionality or dissuasiveness. 
                                               
11 However in article 83 para 9 is defined that «Where the legal system of the Member State does 
not provide for administrative fines, this Article may be applied in such a manner that the fine is 
initiated by the competent supervisory authority and imposed by competent national courts… ». 
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 The principle of proportionality, as principle of the primary European Union law defines the 
mode of action of the relevant supervisory authority. Also, the macro-prudential function-apart 
from the preventive and dissuasive purposes- of administrative fines is limited by the principle of 
proportionality 12. In this context the administrative fine should be significantly higher than any 
profit/cost savings of the infringer while the imposition of an administrative fine to a first-time 
infringer cannot be considered per se disproportionate13. Where administrative fines are imposed 
on undertakings, the supervisory authority should not make allowance for the potential poor 
economic situation of an undertaking when deciding the appropriate amount of the fine. 
On the other hand, where administrative fines are imposed on natural persons « the supervisory 
authority should take account of the general level of income in the Member States as well as the 
economic situation of the person when considering the appropriate amount of the fine14. 
 
1.2. Article 83 para 2 
 1.2.1 Discretion of the supervisory authority in imposing administrative fines. 
 
 Article 83 (1) states that: «The administrative fines shall, depending on the circumstances of 
the individual case, be imposed in addition to, or instead of the corrective measures referred to 
article 58 para 2 of GDPR». The wording of the provision raised the question of whether, in the 
event of a breach of the relevant provisions of Article 83 (4)-(6) of the GDPR, the supervisory 
authority is required or on the contrary has the discretion under the light of feasibility to decide on 
the imposition of the administrative fine15. It is argued that, on the basis of the grammatical 
interpretation of article 83(2)  in conjunction with Recital 148, the supervisory authority is required 
to impose a fine in case of a breach and in preference in relation to the corrective measures of 
article 58 (2) of the GDPR 16.   Given that the administrative fines shall be imposed in addition to or 
                                               
12 Komnios K., «The general conditions for imposing fines under the GDPR: Contribution to the 
interpretation of article 83 of the GDPR», ΔΙΜΕ, 2017/4, 504. 
13 Komnios K.,The general conditions for…, ep.cit. 503 
14  Recital 150 
15 Komnios  K., The general conditions for…, ep.cit.505 
contribution to the interpretation of Rule 83 of the Rules 
16 Recital 148 defines that: « In order to strengthen the enforcement of the rules of this Regulation 
penalties including administrative fines  should be imposed for any infringement of this Regulation, 
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instead of corrective measures of Article 58 the above interpretative version requires the 
imposition of fine in each case 17.  However, the same article referring to elements to be taken into 
account «when deciding whether to impose an administrative fine and deciding on the amount of 
the administrative fine in each individual case», weakening also the argument based on the 
grammatical interpretation of the provision 18 .In the same spirit the provisions of Recital 148 and 
150 reinforce the view that the imposition or not of administrative fines ultimately rests with the 
supervisory authority 19.  Based on the above, it is clear that the imposition of a fine is at the 
discretion of the supervisory authority concerned. However, the supervisory authorities should use 
a consolidated and balanced approach in their use of corrective measures, so as to achieve both an 
effective and dissuasive as well as a proportionate reaction to breach. The point is not to qualify 
the fines as last resort nor to shy away from issuing fines but on the other hand not to use them 
such in a  way that would underestimate their effectiveness as a tool 20. 
 
1.2.2 Assessment criteria 
 
The GDPR provides for potentially massive new fines for violations of its provisions which involve a 
significant increase from the prior EU data protection regime. The frame for administrative fines is 
set according to the type of infringement. With the exception of the provisions of Articles 10 and 
24, any other breach of the provisions of GDPR regarding specific obligations and prohibitions of 
controllers and processors according to article 83 (4) (5) shall be subject to an administrative fine. 
For the infringements not expressly mentioned in the above provisions, the supervisory authority 
cannot in principle impose an administrative fine 21. 
                                                                                                                                                            
in addition to, or instead of appropriate measures imposed by the supervisory authority pursuant 
to this Regulation». 
17 On the contrary, the imposition or not of the measures referred to in Article 58 (2) shall be at the 
discretion of the competent supervisory authority. 
18 Article 83 (2) (b). 
19 Recital 148 the Regulation clarifies that: « In a case of a minor infringement or if the fine likely to 
be imposed would constitute a disproportionate burden to a natural person, a reprimand may be 
issued instead of a fine». Additionally,  Recital 150 states that: «Each supervisory authority should 
have the power to administrative fines...» and consequently no obligation.   
20 See Article 29 Working Party Guidelines 
21 Recital 150 of the GDPR. 
13 
 
In general, the imposition of administrative fines has to be always effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive 22. Article 83 (1) The supervisory authority when deciding whether to impose a fine and 
deciding on its amount «due regard should be given to the circumstances of each individual case» 
as well as to the specific criteria listed in article 83 (2). The conclusions reached in the first stage of 
the assessment may be used in the second part concerning the amount of fines, avoiding thereby 
the need to assess the same criteria twice. In particular, the supervisory authority should take 
account of: a) the nature, gravity and duration of the infringement taking into account the nature, 
scope or purpose of the processing concerned as well as the number of data subjects affected and 
the level of damage suffered by them, b) any intentional or negligent nature of the infringement, c) 
any action taken by the controller or processor to mitigate the damage suffered by data subjects, 
d)the degree of responsibility of the controller or processor taking into account technical and 
organizational measures implemented by them pursuant to Articles 25 and 32, e) any relevant 
previous infringements by the controller or processor, f) the degree of cooperation with the 
supervisory authority, in order to remedy the infringement and mitigate the possible adverse 
effects of the infringement, g) the categories of personal data affected by the infringement, h)the 
manner in which the infringement became known to the supervisory authority, in particular 
whether, and if so to what extent, the controller or processor notified the infringement, i) where 
measures referred to in Article 58(2) have previously been ordered against the controller or 
processor concerned with regard to the same subject-matter, compliance with those measures, j) 
adherence to approved codes of conduct pursuant to Article 40 or approved certification 
mechanism pursuant to Article 42 and k) any other aggravating or mitigating factor applicable to 
the circumstances of the case, such as financial benefits gained or losses avoided, directly or 
indirectly, from the infringement 23. 
 
1.2.2.1 The nature, gravity and duration of the infringement. 
 
 A decisive criterion which must be taken into account by the supervisory authority in 
imposing the administrative fines against controllers and processors, is the nature of the 
infringement. The GDPR, in setting up two different maximum amounts of administrative fines 
(10/20 million Euros) already indicates that a breach of some provisions of the Regulation may be 
more serious than for other provisions. Notwithstanding, the competent supervisory authority by 
                                               
22 Article 83 (1) 
23 Komnios K., The general conditions for…, ep.cit. 503 
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assessing the facts of the case in light of the general criteria provided in article 83 para 2, may 
decide that in the particular case there is a higher or a more reduced need to react with a 
corrective measure in the form of a fine. Where a fine has been chosen as one or one of several 
appropriate corrective measures, the tiering system of the Regulation will be applied to determine 
the maximum fine that can be imposed according to the nature of the infringement in question 24. 
The notion of ΄΄minor infringements΄΄ in Recital 148 may constitute infringements of one or several 
of the provisions of the GDPR enumerated in article 83(4) or (5)25. 
The supervisory authority, however, taking into account the assessment criteria in article 83(2) may 
decide to abstain from imposing an administrative fine on the grounds that in the concrete 
circumstances of the case, the breach for instance, does not pose a significant risk to the rights of 
the data subjects concerned and does not affect the essence of the obligation in question. 
Therefore, in such cases the fines may be superseded by a reprimand. The present provision does 
not impose the obligation on the supervisory authority to replace a fine by a reprimand in every 
case of a minor infringement (΄΄a reprimand may be issued instead of a fine΄΄). By the contrast,  the 
provision establishes discretion for the supervisory authority to impose a less burdensome 
corrective measure after assessing the concrete circumstances of the specific case. The supervisory 
authority also has the discretion to replace the fine by a reprimand in the event that the data 
controller is a natural person and the fine likely to be imposed would constitute a disproportionate 
burden. In principle, the authority taking into account the circumstances of the case at hand, has 
to assess whether a fine should be imposed. Should it find in favor of levying a fine then the 
supervisory authority must also assess whether the fine to be imposed constitute a 
disproportionate burden to a natural person. The GDPR does not define a specific price tag for 
specific infringements only the upper amount of fines. This can be indicative of the relatively lower 
degree of gravity for the breach of obligations listed in article 83(4) in comparison with those set 
out in article 83(5).  However, the effectiveness, proportionality and dissuasiveness of the fine will 
depend on the circumstances of the case. Emphasis should be given in cases where infringements 
that normally due to their nature fall within the scope of article 83 (4), namely involving a fine of 
up to 10 million Euros or up to 2% of total annual worldwide turnover of the preceding financial 
year, might end up qualifying for the higher applicable cap (20 million) in certain circumstances. 
This would be likely to be the case where such breaches have previously been addressed with an 
order by the supervisory authority to which the controller or the processor failed to comply with. 
                                               
24 Αrticles 83 (4)-(6) 
25 See Article 29 Working Party Guidelines 
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The application of article 83(4) must take into account the procedural provisions of national law. In 
particular, the procedural law of each Member State defines how an order is issued, how it is 
notified, from which point it takes effect, whether there is a grace period to work on compliance. 
Notably, the effect of an appeal on the enforceability of an order should be taken into account. 
Similarly, the substantive provisions of national law may in practice have an impact on this 
assessment. 26  With regard to the gravity of the infringement will be sought the effects on the data 
subject as well as the damage can be restituted 27. The purpose of the processing, on the other 
hand, will be considered on the basis of its legality and will be taken into account the duration of  
the infringement .  
Similarly, according to the case law of the Greek Supreme Administrative Court and the current 
legal framework relevant criteria are assessed. 28  Specifically, the imposition of an administrative 
fine depends on a number of factors such as the extent of the infringement, the degree of liability 
of the person liable, his financial standing, the effects of the fine on his reputation, fame, his 
creditworthiness, the magnitude of the risk created or the damage actually caused, any repeated 
infringements, the deliberate infringement of the supervisory authority's recommendations and 
orders, the potential economic benefit of the infringement, the behavior of the person responsible 
after the infringement to mitigate the damage caused, the probable effectiveness of the fine with 
regard to the prevention of future infringements and other relevant factors 29. 
In particular the Superior Administrative Court held that «intent is not a condition for the 
imposition of an administrative fine, but it is sufficient to establish the objective element of the 
damage of the subject»30. There is, however, contradictory case law under which «For the 
imposition of the administrative sanction according to article 21 of Law 2472/1997 suffice to 
establish the particular breach and it is no longer required to establish the occurrence of a 
                                               
26 Statutory provisions of limitation may have the effect that a previous order of the supervisory 
authority may no longer taken into consideration due to the amount of time that lapsed since that 
previous order was issued. The legal regime of some jurisdictions requires that after the 
prescription period has passed with respect to an order, no fine may be imposed for non-
compliance with that order under article 83(6). It will up to each supervisory authority in each 
jurisdiction to determine how such impacts will affect them. 
27 Nemitzin Ehmann/Selmayr, DS-GVO, Art.83 Rn.16 
28 Greek Superior Court of Justice (ΣΤΕ), 1774/2016, 3135/2015, 1367/2008, 94/2003. 
29  Kanelopoulou- Mpoti M., «Sanctions for infringing personal data in « Kotsali Personal Data». 
30 Greek Superior Court of Justice (ΣΤΕ), 4158/2000 
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particular damage to the data subject of the processing of his data or to invoke such damage on his 
part, that is, damage other than that resulting from the processing of his data»31. 
 
1.2.2.2 The intentional or negligent character of the infringement  
 
  Article 83 (2) (b) of GDPR refers that the degree of fault of the infringer is assessed when the fine 
is imposed. Examples of intentional breaches might be the amendment of personal data to give a 
misleading impression about whether targets have been met or the trade of personal data for 
marketing purpose for example selling data as ‘’opted in’’ without checking data subject’s opinions 
about how their data should be issued. On the other hand, circumstances which may be indicative 
of negligence may be: the failure to abide by existing policies, human error, failure to check for 
personal data in information published or failure to apply technical updates in a timely manner or 
failure to adopt policies. Enterprises are responsible for adopting structures and resources 
adequate to the nature and complexity of their business. Therefore, controllers or processors 
cannot legitimize breaches of data protection law by claiming a shortage of resources. Routines 
and documentation of processing activities follow a risk-based approach in line with the 
Regulation32 .Given that the provision concerned, requires from supervisory authorities taking into 
account in their assessment for the imposition of fine «the intention or negligence that caused the 
offense», it is questionable whether the liability of the infringer is necessary or not for the 
imposition of fines  33 . There is great doubt both in theory and case law as to whether objective or 
subjective liability of the infringer is required for the imposition of fines. In one respect the need 
for subjective liability is based on article 83 (2) (b) while in another respect, in order to reach the 
same conclusion, it invokes the principle of proportionality and the principle of liability34. 
 The opposite view advocated that article 83 of GRDP introduces a system of administrative 
sanctions irrespective of the infringer’s liability,  that is strict liability. However, at no point of 
article 83 is defined the subjective attitude of the infringer as a prerequisite for the imposition of 
fine. On the contrary on the European Commission's proposal for a Regulation there was a clear 
reference to the intention or negligence of the infringer 35. The absence of a corresponding 
                                               
31 Greek Superior Court of Justice (ΣΤΕ),1367/2008 
32 See Article 29 Working Party Guidelines 
33 Komnios K., The general conditions for…, ep.cit. 506. 
34 BeckOKDatenSR/Hollander, 20.Ed.1.5.2017, DS-GVO Art.83 Rn.18. 
35 Article 79 (4) (5) and (6) of the  European Commission's proposal for a Regulation. 
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reference to the final version of the relevant provisions of Article 83 suggests that the intention of 
the EU legislator is to establish a strict liability. This view is underpinned both by the wording of 
article 83(2) (b) which states that «due regard should be given» and by Recital 148 of GDPR which 
provide for that in the imposition of administrative fines « due regard should be given (and not 
necessarily) to the intentional nature of the infringement». The introduction of strict liability for 
administrative sanctions does not constitute a novum in the ΕU legal order. It is worth noting that 
neither under Law 2472/1997 is the   subjective liability a precondition for the imposition of fines. 
 In the field of administrative penalties, the principle of subjective liability is not expressly 
enshrined in the ECJ nor  in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. In addition, the Court of 
 Justice of the European Union has not explicitly recognized the principle of subjective liability as a 
general principle of European Union law. In particular the Court ruled that: « although it has not 
given in-depth consideration to the principle of nulla poena sine culpa in its case-law thus far, there  
are nevertheless indications that it takes it as a given that the principle holds at EU level *…+.I 
would add that the principle enjoys the status of a fundamental right which is common to the 
constitutional traditions of the Member States *…+.Although this principle is not expressly 
mentioned in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union or  in the ECHR *…+, it is the 
necessary precondition for the presumption of innocence. The principle of nulla poena sine culpa 
may therefore be considered to be contained implicitly in both Article 48(1) of the Charter and 
Article 6(2) ECHR, which, as has been recognized, must be taken into account in cartel 
proceedings*…+. Ultimately,  these two provisions of the Charter and the ECHR can be regarded as 
the expression in procedural law of the principle of nulla poena sine culpa»36. 
The ECJ accepts the imposition of administrative sanctions irrespective of the infringer fault, 
provided that it complies with the principle of proportionality37. In particular, «according to the 
Court the imposition of a system of strict liability is not disproportionate in relation to the 
objectives pursued if that system is such as to encourage the persons concerned to comply with the 
provisions of a regulation and where the objective pursued is a matter of public interest which may 
justify the introduction of such a system». In general, the characteristics of an intentional 
infringement contain both knowledge and willfulness of the infringement whereas 
΄΄unintentional΄΄ indicate that there was no intention for the commitment of the infringement 
                                               
36 ECJ, C-681/1, Schenker&Co AG and Others, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, ( para. 41). 
37ECJ, C-210/10, Urban, (par 47- 48 ), ECJ 2 C-497/15 and C-498/15, Euro-Team Kft and Spiral-
GepKft.,(par.53 et.seq), ECJ, C-210/10, Käserei Champignon Hofmeister, (par. 62-68), ECJ C-326/88 
Hansen, (par. 19). 
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even though the controller or processor breached the imposed by the law duty of care. In the 
above context, given that it is stated inter alia that the intent or negligence of the infringer must be 
taken into account, be grounded on theory if liability of the infringer is necessary for the 
imposition of the fine. 
However, in the case Käserei Champignon Hofmeister, the Court ruled that «Α penalty which is 
provided for by a Regulation is likely to breach the principle ΄΄nullapoena΄΄ sine culpa » only if it is 
of criminal nature»38 . 
According to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of the European 
Union, the penal nature of a penalty is based on three criteria which are determined in the case 
Engel. In particular, «the first criterion is the legal classification of the offence under national law, 
the second is the very nature of the offence and the third is the nature and degree of severity of the 
penalty that the person concerned is liable to incur»39. 
As regards the legal classification of the sanction in question, «is not considered criminal in nature 
under the EU Law» since it is characterized by GDPR as administrative penalty40 . 
In line with article 83, the purpose of imposing an administrative penalty, is the compliance of the 
infringer with the requirements of Regulation as well as the faithful observance and enforcement 
of personal data protection rules, not the punishment of the infringer. The preventive nature of the 
administrative fine follows from article 83 (1) which stipulates «that the imposition of an 
administrative fine shall be dissuasive» as well as by Recital 150 which provides for that «the 
purpose of the imposition of administrative penalties is to prevent or mitigate the consequences of 
the infringement». In any case, the rule of article 83 is not addressed to all citizens, but to the 
recipients described therein. In addition, the administrative fines of article 83, as opposed to the 
penalty, they do not express any social disapproval whereas they are not always on an individual 
nature since they are usually imposed on legal persons for acts or omission of their personnel. In 
conclusion, the administrative sanction does not constitute a penal sanction since it is directed to a 
particular circle of recipients and performs only a dissuasive function. The penal sanction extends 
beyond mere deterrence and includes also social disapproval. However in the light of the recent 
case-law in case Ute Reindl, the ECJ ruled that «even if it were accepted that the sanctions of 
                                               
38 ECJ, C-210/00,Käserei Champignon Hofmeister, (2001),Opinion of Advocate General Stix-Hackl 
(par.33-35). 
39 ECHR, Engel and Others v. the Netherlands, (1976), Series A No.22, (par.80-82),  ECHR, Sergey 
Zolotukhin v. Russia, (2009) No.14933/03 (par. 52 and 53). 
40  ECJ, C-489/10, Bonda, (par.38) 
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article 83 of the GDPR are of penal nature-which mainly due to the amount of fine fall within the 
field of penal law within the meaning of ECHR- such a system (of strict liability) is not in itself 
disproportionate to the objectives pursued, if that system is such as to encourage the persons 
concerned to comply with the provisions of a regulation and where the objective pursued is a 
matter of public interest which may justify the introduction of such a system»41. 
The Greek Superior Administrative Court has also accepted, though not uniformly, the system of 
strict liability for administrative penalties42. Intentional breaches, due to the contempt of the 
infringer with regard to the provisions of law, are more severe than unintentional (breaches), 
therefore it is more likely to result in the application of administrative fines. The supervisory 
authority in order to find out intentional or negligent behavior of the offender based on objective 
elements of conduct of the individual case. Moreover, emerging jurisprudence and practice in the 
field of data protection under the Regulation should be taken into account by the supervisory 
authority in the assessment of the circumstances which establish an intentional nature of the 
breach. Circumstances indicative of intentional breaches might be unlawful processing authorized 
explicitly by the top management hierarchy of the controller, or in spite of advice from the data 
protection officer or in disregard for existing policies for instance obtaining and processing data 
about employees at a competitor with an intention to discredit that competitor in the market 43. 
 
1.2.2.3 Any action taken by the controller or processor to mitigate the damage suffered by them 
 
Article 83 (2) (c) seeks to encourage the controller or the processor to mitigate the damage caused 
by the infringement. The mitigation of damage does not only refer to the property damage but to 
the removal of any consequence of the infringement to the subject of the rights.  However, after 
the occurrence of the breach, the responsible party should take all necessary measures in order to 
mitigate the consequences of the breach for the individual(s) concerned. Such responsible 
behaviour would be taken into account by the supervisory authority when determining the 
appropriate corrective measure and the amount of the sanction to be imposed in the specific case. 
On contradistinction, the supervisory authority will assess negatively the absence of actions aimed 
at mitigating the damage 44. 
                                               
41 ECJ, C-443/13, Ute Reindl, (2014), (par. 42), ECJ, C-326/88, Hansen, 1990, (par.19). 
42 Greek Superior Administrative Court, (ΣΤΕ), 119/2015,751/2010, 2491/2008. 
43 See Article 29 Working Party Guidelines 
44 Nemitz in Ehmann/Seimayr, DS-GVO, Art.83 Rn.19 
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 Therefore, aggravating and mitigating factors are taken into account not only for the proper 
determination of the amount of a fine but also in the choice of appropriate corrective measures. In 
particular, in cases where the supervisory authority doubts about the appropriateness of an 
administrative fine (whether it should be imposed the fine as a standalone measure or in 
combination with the measures provided in article 58) aggravating and attenuating circumstances 
constitute a helpful tool for the supervisory authority to select the measure which is more 
effective, proportionate and dissuasive in the case in question 45. The present provision requires 
the assessment of  the degree of responsibility of the responsible persons after the occurrence of 
the infringement and lead to a more flexible approach for data controllers or processors who after 
having been informed of the infringement taken the responsibility trying to rectify the situation or 
limit the impact of their actions. For instance, the contact of the controller or processor with other 
controllers or processors who may have been involved in an extension of the processing or the 
timely action of the former to stop the infringement from expanding to a level which would have 
had more serious impact that it did, may constitute mitigating factors in favor of these persons. 
  
1.2.2.4 The degree of responsibility of the controller or processor taking into account technical or 
organizational measures implemented by them pursuant to Articles 25 and 32 
 
The degree of responsibility referred in Article 83(2)(d) associated with the degree of fault in 
Article 83 (2)(a) but specifies the responsibility with respect to technical and organizational 
measures implemented by controllers/processors pursuant to article 25 and 32 of GDPR. 
The Regulation has established a greater level of accountability of the data controller in 
comparison to the EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EU. 
The degree of responsibility of the controller or processor constitutes a decisive factor during 
supervisory authority’s assessment regarding the application of the most appropriate corrective 
measure. In particular the supervisory authority shall take into account: If the controller put into 
effect technical measures which are consistent with the principles of data protection by design or 
by default (article 25), and implemented organizational measures which give effect to the 
principles of data protection by design and by default (article 25) at all levels of organization, 
whether the controller or processor adopted an appropriate level of security (article 32), and 
                                               
45 Article 29 Working Party Guidelines 
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should the relevant data protection routines and policies are known and applied at the appropriate 
level of management in the organization (article 24) 46. 
Articles 25 and 32 of the GDPR require  : «the controllers take into account the state of the art, the 
cost of implementation and the nature, scope, context and purposes of the processing, as well as 
the risks of varying likelihood and severity for rights and freedoms for the natural persons posed by 
the processing». The provisions introduce obligations of means rather than obligations of goals, 
that is, the controller should make the necessary assessments and draw the appropriate 
conclusions. The supervisory authority should evaluate if the controller did what it could be 
expected to do given the nature, the purposes or the size of the processing seen in light of the 
obligations imposed on them by the Regulation. The supervisory authority in its assessment should 
take into consideration any ‘’best practice’’ procedures or applied methods as well as industry 
standards and codes of conduct in the respective field of profession. Codes of practice might be 
illustrative of the common practice in the field and of the level of knowledge about different 
means to address typical security issues associated with the processing. While best practice would 
be the ideal to pursue in general, the special circumstances of each individual case should be taken 
into consideration when the supervisory authority making the assessment of the degree of 
responsibility 47. Especially for legal persons, «each undertaking must be aware of the actions of its 
employees who have committed the infringement and cannot rely on malfunctioning of its internal 
organization»48 .In addition, «the infringement can be established without demanding the 
identification of the persons who had acted improperly within the undertaking or who ought to 
have been responsible for any defective organization of the undertaking»49. The diligence required 
in the transactions will be determined on the basis of the size of the business, the type of economic 
activity and the data processing operations50 . 
 
                                               
46 See Article 29 Working Party Guidelines 
47 See Article 29 Working Party Guidelines 
48 General Court, Τ-161/05, Hoechst GmbH,  (2009), (par. 55) 
49 ECJ,  C-338/00P, Volkswagen AG,  (2003), (par. 98) 
50 BeckOKDatenSR/Hollander, 20. Ed.1.5.2017, DS-GVO Art.83 Rn.34 
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1.2.2.5 Any relevant previous infringements by the controller or processor 
 
Article 83(2)(e) acts as an aggravating factor against the habitual infringer and highlights the 
pedagogical function of the fines, providing that any relevant previous infringements may be 
aggravating in the case of a new infringement. This criterion aims to assess the track record of the 
entity committing the infringement. The scope of the assessment hereto can be quite wide since 
any infringement of the Regulation although different in nature to the one being investigated by 
the supervisory authority might be ‘’relevant’’ for the assessment as it could be indicative of a 
general level of insufficient knowledge or disregard for the data protection law51. 
 The supervisory authority should examine whether the controller or the processor committed the 
same infringement earlier or in the same manner. That is the case in which the controller or 
processor did not respond to requests of data subjects in a timely manner on the ground of 
insufficient knowledge of the existing routines in the organization. 
 The provision may constitute a disincentive preventing controllers from cooperating with 
processors who have already committed a breach of legislation. However, apart from the relevance 
of the infringements, it also should also be taken into account the time dimension so as not 
counted any lapsed breaches52. 
 
1.2.2.6 The degree of cooperation with the supervisory authority in order to remedy the infringe-
ment and mitigate the possible adverse effects of the infringement 
 
Article 83(2)(f) provides that: « The degree of cooperation may be given due regard when deciding 
whether to impose an administrative fine and in determining  the amount of fine.  
The Regulation does not clarify how to take into account the efforts of the controllers or 
processors to remedy an infringement already established by the supervisory authority. However, 
when the intervention of the controller mitigates the impact of the negative consequences on the 
rights of individuals this could also be taken into account by the supervisory authority in the 
determination of the amount of fines. 53. The supervisory authority also shall assess positively the 
proper response of the entity to its requests at the stage of the investigation if in the particular 
case the entity’s cooperation result in the limitation of the negative impact on individuals’ rights. 
                                               
51See Article 29 Working Party Guidelines, p.14 
52BeckOKDatenSR/Hollander, 20. Ed.1.5.2017, DS-GVO Art.83 Rn.37. 
53 See Article 29 Working Party Guideline, 14 
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On the contrary, the supervisory authority should not take into consideration entity’s cooperation 
that is already required by law. For example, the entity is in any case required to allow the 
supervisory authority access to premises for audits/inspections. 
 
1.2.2.7 The categories of the personal data affected by the infringement 
 
Another criterion to be evaluated by the supervisory authority is the categories of the personal 
data affected by the infringement. In particular, the supervisory authorities may examine whether 
the infringement concerns the processing of special categories of data as provided for in articles 9 
and 10 of GDPR. It should also find out if the data is directly/ indirectly identifiable, whether the 
processing involves data whose dissemination could cause immediate damage or distress to the 
individual or if the data is directly available without technical protections or it is encrypted. 
 However, the fact that the infringement concerns only indirectly identifiable data or even 
pseudonymous/encrypted data does not in every case constitute an attenuating circumstance. For 
such breaches the supervisory authority may assess and other criteria for deciding on the 
necessity of imposing a fine 54. 
  
1.2.2.8 The manner in which the infringement became known to the supervisory authority, in par-
ticular whether, and if so to what extent the controller of processor notified the infringement. 
 
 Article 33 of the GDPR, requires the controller to notify without undue delay the supervisory 
authority of personal data breaches. The compliance of the controller with this obligation cannot 
be interpreted as a mitigating factor given that it constitutes a duty required by the law. 
Similarly, the data controller or processor who acted carelessly without notifying or at least not 
notifying all of the details of the infringement either does not notify the supervisory authority may 
be subject to a serious penalty by the supervisory authority. 
The provision in question in so far as it also concerns the processor, is incompatible with the 
provision of Article 33 (2) which requires the processor to notify the controller without undue delay 
and not the supervisory authority. 55 
 
                                               
54 See Article 29 Working Party Guidelines, p.15 
55 Nemitz in Ehmann/Seimayr, DS-GVO, Art.83 Rn.25. 
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1.2.2.9 Where measures referred to in Article 58(2) have previously been ordered against the con-
troller or processor concerned with regard to the same subject matter, compliance with those 
measures. 
 
The supervisory authority is likely to already monitor the controller/processor due to a previous 
infringement which has been committed by them. Therefore, the contacts of the supervisory 
authority which are likely to be extensive with the controller/processor should be taken into 
account in deciding the imposition of a fine. Contrary to the assessment in (e), this criterion seeks 
only to remind supervisory authority to refer to measures which have been previously imposed on 
the same controller or processor 56. 
 
1.2.2.10 Adherence to approval codes of conduct pursuant to Article 40 or approved certification 
mechanisms pursuant to Article 42. 
 
According to Article 57 (1) (a) «The supervisory has among others the duty to monitor and enforce 
the application of this Regulation». Adherence to approved codes of conduct or approved 
certification mechanisms may be used by the controllers or processors as a way to demonstrate 
compliance with the requirements of law.57 The compliance with codes of conducts and the 
certification will be positively assessed by the supervisory authority since their adoption limit the 
likelihood of an infringement. In the event of a violation of one of the provisions of the Regulation,  
supervisory authority shall take into account the compliance of the controller or processor with an 
approved code of conduct in order to decide the necessity of imposing an effective, proportionate, 
dissuasive fine or other corrective measure. According to Article 40 (4): «A code of conduct shall 
contain mechanisms which enable the (monitoring) body to carry out the mandatory monitoring of 
compliance with its provisions by the controllers or processors which undertake to apply it ». This 
arrangement gives the supervisory authority the flexibility to refrain from imposing a fine or 
additional measures given that the competent code community has taken the necessary action 
against their members thought monitoring and enforcement schemes of the code of conduct. 
Therefore, the monitoring body may impose sanctions for non-compliant behavior including 
                                               
56See Article 29 Working Party Guidelines 
57See Articles 24(3), 28(5), 32(3) of GDPR. 
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suspension or exclusion of the controller or processor concerned from the code community. 
Notwithstanding, the supervisory authority is not obliged to take into consideration previous 
sanctions which have been imposed by the monitoring body on the grounds that the powers of the 
monitoring body are «without prejudice to the tasks and powers of the competent supervisory 
authority» 58. The failure of the controller/processor to comply with self-regulatory measures could 
also be indicative of their intentional or negligent behavior of non-compliance. 
 
1.2.2.11 Any other aggravating or mitigating factor applicable to the circumstances of the case, 
such as financial benefits gained, or losses avoided, directly or indirectly from the infringement. 
 
 The present provision introduces an auxiliary clause which allows the supervisory authority 
to take into account any other aggravating or mitigating factor resulting from the circumstances of 
the particular case when deciding the appropriateness of an administrative fine.  
 Τhe provision itself gives example of which other elements might be taken into account 
when supervisory authority deciding the appropriateness of an administrative fine for breaches of 
the provisions mentioned in article 83 (4)-(6). In provision is expressly stated that the profit 
resulting from a breach may be a decisive factor for the supervisory authority as economic gain 
from the infringement can only be compensated though the imposition of administrative fines 
which are of pecuniary nature 59. Moreover, the supervisory authority is likely to assess as a 
mitigating factor any legitimate doubt as to the illegality of the processing while it will obviously 
assess as an aggravating factor the potential active attempt of the offender to prevent the 
revelation of the truth.. 
 
1.3 Levels of fines 
1.3.1 Level 1 infringements 
 
GDPR by splitting up the fines in two groups indicates by definition factors regarding the different 
impact and importance of several potential breached obligations. 
Article 83 (4) of GDPR provides for that: «Fines of up to 10 million euros or in the case of an 
undertaking up to 2% of the total worldwide annual turnover of the preceding financial year 
                                               
58Article 41 (1) 
59 See Article 29 Working Party Guidelines 
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whichever is higher, shall be imposed on the controllers or processors for breaches of the 
provisions with regard to: the conditions applicable to child’s consent in relation to information 
society60, processing which not require identification61, general obligations, obligations relating to 
security of personal data, data protection impact assessment and prior consultation and the data 
officer62, certification and certification bodies63. Similarly, the same amount of fines shall be 
imposed on certification bodies 64 as well as on monitoring bodies for failure to comply with their 
obligations under the Regulation65. The omission of GDPR to provide for the administrative 
sanction of fine for infringements related to the processing of personal data concerning to criminal 
convictions and offences can be attributed to  legislators oversight 66. 
 
 
1.3.2 Level 2 infringements 
 
More serious infringements of the GDPR are subject to administrative fines of up to 20 million 
euros or, in the case of undertakings, 4% of the total worldwide annual turnover of the proceeding 
financial year whichever is higher 67. In particular, breaches which lead to this applicable cap are 
those concerning: the basic principles for processing including conditions for consent 68, data 
subject’s rights69, transfers of personal data to a third country or an international organization70, 
obligations pursuant to Member States law adopted under Chapter IX of the GDPR and non-
compliance with an order or a temporary or definitive limitation on processing or the suspension 
of data flow by the supervisory authority 71 or failure to access in violation of GDPR. 
                                               
60Article 8 of GDPR 
61Article 11 of GDPR 
62Articles 25-39 of the GDPR 
63Articles 42 and 43 of the GDPR 
64Articles 42 and 43. 
65Article 41 para 4. 
66 Rucher D./ Kugler T., New European General Data Protection Regulation…,ep.cit, p.186 
67Article 83 para 5 
68Articles 5,6,7 of the GDPR 
69Article 12-22 of GDPR 
70Article 44-49 of GDPR 
71Article 85 para 2 
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On January 21, 2019 the French Data Protection Authority (the ΄CNIL΄΄), after collective actions 
filed by two non-profit associations, imposed a fine of 50 million euros on Google LLD. This is the 
first fine imposed by the CNIL under the GDPR and the highest fine imposed by a supervisory 
authority within the EU under the GDPR to date72. 
 
1.3.3 Level of fines in the event of infringement of several provisions of the Regulation 
 
In some cases, the applicable cap may not always be clear, for instance, a breach of a security 
obligation which is subject to the lower cap may also result in breaches of the principles of 
integrity and confidentiality subject to the higher cap. Therefore, further guidance will be needed 
from data protection authorities as well as case law interpreting the GDPR. 
According to article 83 (3): « If a controller or processor intentionally or negligently for the same or 
linked processing operations infringe several provisions of the GDPR, the total amount of the 
administrative fine shall not exceed the amount specified for the gravest infringement». 
That is to say, in the event of more infringements, the authority is entitled to the imposition of an 
increased fine, the total amount of which may not exceed the amount determined for the heaviest 
infringement, and in any case, the limits laid down in Article 283 (4) and (5). 
With regard to the possibility of imposing a single fine in case of more infringements, the Greek 
Superior Administrative Court has ruled that « Article 21 of Law 2472/1997 does not exclude the 
imposition of a single fine for several violations of the legislation on the protection of personal data 
therefore the supervisory authorities are entitled to impose a single fine in case of different 
infringements of the data protection legislation»73However, article 83(3) refers only to controllers 
and processors, leaving outside its scope the other categories of infringers without sufficient 
reasons. The principle «ne bis in idem», as interpreted by the ECJ, must be observed in proceedings 
for the imposition of a fine74. However, pursuant to the case law of ECJ «neither the principle of ne 
bis in idem nor any other principle of law obliging the supervisory authority to take account of 
proceedings and penalties to which an undertaking has been subject in non-Member States»75. 
                                               
72See: Εuropean Union impose 50 million euros in https://abcdigital.ie 
73 Greek Superior Administrative Court,  (ΣΤΕ), 442/2014 
74 Recital 149 states that: «The imposition of criminal penalties for infringements of national laws 
and of administrative penalties should not lead to a breach of the principle of ne bis in idem as 
interpreted by the Court of Justice». 
75 ECJ, C-289/04 P, Showa Denko KK, (2006), (par.56-57) 
28 
 
 Hereto, the case law in relation to the corresponding provisions of the Directive 95/46/EU is 
expected to partially mitigate the identified ambiguity. Similar reservations have also been raised 
for the provisions regulating the amount of the imminent administrative fines.  
In particular, with regard to the upper limit of the fines imposed on undertakings, it is argued that 
this is lacking predictability in so far as the fine is calculated in an abstract manner, as a percentage 
of the total worldwide annual turnover of the infringing undertaking. 76 However, related 
objections in relation to Article 23 of the Regulation 1/2003 in relation to fines for infringements of 
the law on cartels  dismissed by the ECJ 77. Lastly, troublesome, and in terms of the principle of 
specialty, is the notion of the enterprise in Article 83.  The ambiguity found, beyond the theoretical 
debate, undermines the legal certainty, since it can catalytically affect the amount of the fines by 
provoking unpredictable variations.78 
 
 
1.4 The principle of specificity and of predictability 
 
Article 83 which provides for the general framework for the imposition of fines, referring to other 
provisions, raising concerns about the compatibility of the framework with the principle of 
specificity and the need for predictability. In line with the case law of ECJ «a penalty, even of a non-
criminal nature, cannot be imposed unless it rests on a clear and unambiguous legal basis»79.  
Similarly, the provision in addition to  the infringement, must specify the penalties provided for. 
In this context, the principle of the lawfulness of offenses and penalties requires, inter alia, that 
Community rules are clear and precise, in particular when they impose or permit the imposition of 
sanctions so that interested parties are clearly aware of the rights and obligations arising from 
these arrangements and to take the appropriate measures 80. This principle applies both to 
criminal rules and to specific administrative arrangements which impose administrative penalties 
or allow their enforcement. 81 The prevailing view in the theory is that the provision of Article 
                                               
76BeckOKDatenSR/Hollander, 20.Ed. 1.5.2017, DS-GVO Art.83 Rn.7-7.1. 
77  ECJ, C-501/11P, Schindler, (2003)(par.58). 
78 Komnios K., The general conditions for…, ep.cit 512 
79 ECJ, C-137/85 Maizena GesellschaftmbH, (1987),  (par.15), ECJ, C-210/00, Kaserei Champignon 
Hofmeister, (2002), (par.52) 
80Komnios K., The general conditions for…, ep.cit 511-512. 
81 General Court, T-99/04, AC-Treuhand AG, (2008), (par.31). 
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83(5)(α) is particularly problematic, which refers to «basic principles for processing, including 
conditions for consent, pursuant to Articles 5,6,7 and 9». In particular, the provision of Article 5, 
referring to the principles governing the processing of personal data, teemed with vague concepts, 
making it difficult for the subjects to comply with the legislative requirements and take the 
appropriate measures, in view of the fact that for the time being there is no clarification of the 
rules of liability by the judicial interpretation. Hereto, the case law in relation to the corresponding 
provisions of the Directive 95/46/EU is expected to mitigate partly the ambiguity in question. 
Similar concerns have also been raised for the provisions regulating the amount of the 
administrative fines. 
In particular, with regard to the upper limit of the fines imposed on undertakings, it is argued that 
this is lacking predictability in so far as the fine is calculated in an abstract manner, as a percentage 
of the total worldwide annual turnover of the infringing undertaking.82 However, related 
objections in relation to Article 23 of the Regulation 1/2003 in relation to fines for infringements of 
the law on cartels dismissed by the ECJ 83.   
Also, controversial, and in the light of principle of specificity- is the ‘’notion of undertaking’’ in 
Article 83 (4)-(6). The ambiguity found, beyond the theoretical debate, undermines the legal 
certainty, as it can dramatically affect the level of administrative fines causing unpredictable 
variations. 
  
  
                                               
82BeckOKDatenSR/Hollander,20.Ed. 1.5.2017, DS-GVO Art.83 Rn.7-7.1. 
83 Cf. ECJ, decision of 18 July 2013, C-501/11P, Schindler, (par.58). 
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Chapter 2. Recipients and procedure of administrative fines 
 
2.1.1 The recipients of fines. 
 
 The administrative fines of article 83(4) are imposed by the supervisory authorities against 
the controllers and processors as well as against the certification and monitoring bodies84. 
Therefore, a fine cannot by imposed neither against a processor or and any person acting under 
the authority of the controller or of the processor (article 29 of GDPR), nor against the controller’s 
representatives (articles 31 and 32 of GDPR) or on a data or recipient subject since they do not 
have any of the above characteristics. Similarly, a fine cannot be imposed on the data protection 
officer (article 4(7)) so that the reference of Article 39 concerning the duties of the Data Protection 
Officer, in Article 38 (4) (a) which defines the obligations of the controller or the processor is likely 
by mistake. It should be noted that it follows from Article 21 of Law 2472/1997 that the provisions 
regarding the imposition of administrative fines does not apply to the processors. The 
arrangement will nevertheless not apply to the extent that it is contrary to the GDPR. 
On the other hand, administrative fines for breaches of articles Article 83 (5) and (6) shall be 
imposed under the substantive law on any infringer given that the articles in question do not 
designate specific recipients of the fines such as article 83(4). 
Regarding the orders of the supervisory authorities, although they are generally addressed the 
controllers and to the processors as well as to the certification bodies, on the basis of Article 83 
(6), it is argued that administrative fines can also be imposed against persons who are required to 
comply with the specific orders85. 
In addition, contrary to the applicable Greek legislation, where pursuant to Article 21 of Law 
2472/1997, the Data Protection Authority imposes the administrative sanctions of the above 
article without exception on the controllers or their representatives and hence on public 
authorities, in other EU countries, as in Germany, it is not permissible to impose a fine on public 
authorities. 
In the context of GDPR it is up to the Member States to decide whether and to what extent fines 
may be imposed on public authorities.86  
                                               
84Articles 43 and 41 of GDPR 
85Αrticle 58 (2) in conjunction with article 83 (6) 
86 Article 83(7) in conjunction with the Recital 150. 
 
31 
 
 
2.1.2 The notion of ‘’undertaking’’ 
 
Regarding the definition of the notion ‘’undertaking’’ is particularly crucial since it relates to the 
method of calculating the administrative fines.87. The GDPR does not define the notion in question, 
however it should not be equated to the definition of an enterprise pursuant to article 4 (18) of the 
GDPR 88.  Recital 150 of the GDPR, defines that: «an enterprise should rather be understood as an 
undertaking in accordance with Articles 102 and 102 of the TFEU, where fines are to be imposed on 
an undertaking». The TFEU does also not define the notion in question. According to the broad 
interpretation applied by the ECJ in antitrust cases: «an undertaking is every entity engaged in an 
economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the entity or the way in which is financed89. 
Therefore, the ECJ has approved antitrust fines imposed by the Commission pursuant to article 101 
of TFEU, on the parent company of a group of undertakings despite the fact that the parent 
company had not been involved in the infringement. The Court held that «the mere fact that the 
parent company and its subsidiary, which have committed the infringement, form a single 
economic entity suffices to establish the parent’s company liability. 90 
 Some authors in the legal literature and some data protection authorities draw for the 
reference in Recital 150 recital of the GDPR, to the notion of an undertaking in the antitrust 
context as described above that also under article 83 of the GDPR the group and not the individual 
legal entity is meant. The acceptance of the above assessment could lead to the following 
implications. First, fines against undertakings would be calculated on the basis of the turnover of 
the whole group of companies and not according to the turnover of the infringing legal entity. 
Second, the adoption of the definition of undertaking as applied by the ECJ in antitrust cases could 
also mean flexibility for the supervisory authority when determining the recipient(s) of an 
administrative fee. In the event of antitrust violations, fines can be levied a mother company for 
                                                                                                                                                            
 
87 Rucket /Kugler., New European General Data…,ep.cit187-188. 
88 Αrticle 4 para 18 states that: « enterprise means a natural or legal person engaged in an 
economic activity irrespective of its legal form, including partnerships or associations engaged in 
an economic activity». 
89 ECJ, C-41/90-Hofner and Elser 
90 ECJ, C-521/09 P- Elf Aquitaine; ECJ, C-440/11P-Stichting   Administratie kantoor Portielje 
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the breach committed by its subsidiaries under certain conditions91. Moreover, the antitrust 
definition of an undertaking enables the supervisory authority to impose fines after corporate 
restructurings on the legal successors of the infringing undertaking as they are generally 
considered to be still the same undertaking as their legal predecessor. 
 However, there remains a large legal uncertainty should the notion of an undertaking in 
GDPR can really be identical to the ECJ’s interpretation in the antitrust context, on the grounds that 
in article 19 (4) of GDPR is expressly defined the term ΄΄group of undertakings΄΄.This differentiation 
in the text of the Regulation between an ‘’undertaking’’ and a ‘’group of undertakings’’ indicates 
that the legislator may not have made intentional reference to case law  under which he ECJ 
interprets the term  ‘’undertaking’’ as including also a group of undertakings. It follows from the 
above that is hampered the interpretative use of Recital 150 taking also into account that pursuant 
to the settled case law of the ECJ «The preamble to a Community act has no binding legal force 
and cannot be relied on either as a ground for derogating from the actual provisions of the act in 
question or for interpreting those provisions in a manner clearly contrary to their wording».92 
It is up to the national authorities to apply and ultimately to the ECJ to define the exact meaning of 
the undertaking in Article 83 of the GDPR. 
The fines concern companies either established in the Union or not established in the Union 
«where the processing activities are related to a) the offering of goods or services to the data 
subjects in Union, irrespective of whether a payment of the data subject is required or b) the 
monitoring of their behavior as far as their behavior takes place within the Union»93. 
 
2.2 The Procedure for imposing administrative fines 
 
2.2.1 Competent body for imposing administrative fines. 
 
 With regard to the power to impose administrative fines, article 83 does not contain a 
specific provision. However, given that the imposition of an administrative fine, according to Article 
83 (2), falls within the corrective powers of article 58(2) (a) of GDPR, the power of the supervisory 
authority to impose fines is founded on article 55 of the GDPR. Therefore, and without prejudice to 
                                               
91 Cf.ECJ, decision of 29 September 2011, C-521/09 P- Elf Aquitaine; ECJ, decision of 11 July 2013, 
C-440/11P-Stichting   Administratie kantoorPortielje. 
92 Cf. ECJ, decision of 24 November 2005, C-136/04, DeutschesMilch-Kontor, (parag.32) 
93 Article 3 para 2 of GDPR. 
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Article 83 (9), competent to levy administrative penalties are only the supervisory authorities and 
are not other national authorities. Each supervisory authority shall impose fines on the territory of 
its Member State. In particular, under Article 55 (1): «Each supervisory authority shall be 
competent for the performance of the tasks assigned to and the exercise of the powers conferred 
on it in accordance with this Regulation on the territory of its own Member State». In case of 
infringements in more than one Member States, the risk of imposing multiple administrative fines 
is prevented by the provision of article 56 (1) which determines that: «The supervisory authority of 
the main establishment or of the single establishment of the controller or processor shall be 
competent to act as lead supervisory authority for the cross-border processing carried out by that 
controller or processor». This is inferred by the exceptional provision of article 56 (2) according to 
which «Each supervisory authority shall be competent to handle a complaint lodged with it or a 
possible infringement of this Regulation, if the subject matter relates only to an establishment in its 
Member State or substantially affects data subjects only in its Member State». Consequently, in any 
other case competent to impose administrative fines is only the lead supervisory authority. 
Moreover, the procedure for imposing administrative fines as such is not defined by the 
Regulation. However, article 83 (8) provides for that « The exercise by the supervisory authority of 
its power under this Article shall be subject to appropriate procedural safeguards in accordance 
with Union and Member State law, including effective judicial remedy and due process»94. 
 
2.2.2 Administrative complaints 
 
 According to Article 77 of the Regulation: «If a data subject feels that his rights under the 
GDPR have been violated, he can lodge an administrative complaint with a single supervisory 
authority, in particular in the Member State of his habitual residence, place of work or place of the 
alleged infringement». The supervisory authority upon such complaint, which can be lodged, inter 
alia, by means of an electronic complaint submission form, must commence an investigation of the 
alleged infringement by the data controller or processor. In addition, Recital 141 stipulates that: 
«The investigation by the supervisory authority should be carried out as appropriate on a case-by-
case basis and subject to the judicial review 95. 
                                               
94 Also,  Recital 148 of GDPR stipulates that « The imposition of penalties including administrative 
fines should be subject to appropriate procedural safeguards in accordance with the general 
principles of Union law and the Charter, including effective judicial protection and due process» 
95 Rucket/Kugler., New European General Data…, ep.cit.190. 
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 The supervisory authority should inform the data subject of the progress and the outcome of the 
complaint within a reasonable period». 
Moreover, according to Article 78 (1)(2):«Each natural or legal person shall have the right to 
effective judicial remedy against a legally binding decision of a supervisory authority concerning 
them». The supervisory authority before the imposition of the administrative fine should ensure 
that have been observed all the fundamental rights of the alleged infringer, that is, the right to a 
prior hearing and the right to judicial protection. Measures such as opinions or advice provided by 
the Supervisory Authority are not encompassed by these rights since they are not binding 96 . 
According to article 21 para 2 of the Law 2472/1997 «The administrative sanctions are always 
imposed upon prior hearing of the controller or his representative».97 The Greek Supreme 
Administrative Court held that: «The provision of Article 21 para 2 of Law 2472/1997, interpreted 
in the light of Article 20 of the Constitution, has the meaning that the Authority, in exercising its 
aforementioned competence is required to duly observe the procedure for the hearing of the 
person concerned, which is also provided for in Article 6 of the Code of Administrative Procedure. 
That is to say, the Authority, by law, makes findings of infringements of the provisions on the 
lawfulness of data processing always after a lawful hearing of the person to whom the 
infringement is attributed». Consequently, the supervisory authority before holding a meeting for 
imposing a fine is required to invite via summons the alleged infringer for presenting his 
arguments. Text of summons must state the reasons for which he is invited and should be served 
to the person concerned within a reasonable time before the hearing in order to be properly 
prepared. In addition, the supervisory authority, where feasible, should invite the data subject that 
affected by the infringement in order to expose his arguments and also for giving to the alleged 
infringer the right to make any rebuttal 98. The decisions of the Authority imposing fines constitute 
title of execution and shall be served on the controller or his representative.  
 In accordance with the general principles of the Union, «the supervisory authority is 
required to provide a statement of reasons in a decision imposing a fine, inter alia, for the amount 
of the fine imposed and the method chosen in that regard 99. The statement of reasons must show 
                                               
96 Recital 143. 
97 See Supreme Administrative Court, decision No. 96/2003. 
98 Kanelopoulou Mpoti M., Sanctions for infringing personal data in Kotsali Personal data, 2016, 
407, Armanentos P./Sotiroupolos V. Personal Data, 2005,516-517. 
99 Kanellopoulou-Mpoti M., Sanctions for the infringements of personal data in Kotsalis Personal 
data, 2016,407 where it is referred that :« The Authority’s decision imposing a fine should include 
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clearly and unequivocally the reasoning followed by the authority, so as to enable those concerned 
to know the grounds justifying the measure taken in order that they may assess whether it is 
appropriate to bring the matter before the Community judicature and if they do so, to enable the 
Court to carry out its review». 
 GDPR does not provide for the limitation periods within which the supervisory authorities 
should impose the administrative sanctions for breaches of its provisions. Therefore, the adoption 
of different limitation periods by the Member States hampers the desired uniform and consistent 
application of the rules of GDPR in the European Union100. 
  
2.2.3 Proceedings against the data controllers and data processors. 
 
 Additionally, data subjects entitled to brought proceedings directly against data controllers or 
processors for any breach of the GDPR regarding the processing of their personal data 101. 
This is a major difference compared to the Directive 95/46 which provided for judicial remedy 
against controllers but not against processors. Proceedings shall be brought either before the 
courts of the Member State where the infringer is established or, unless the infringer is a public 
authority of a Member State acting in the exercise of its public powers, before the courts of the 
Member State of the data subject’s residence102. In order to avoid contradictory judgments, GDPR 
states that «If related proceedings are pending before a court of another Member State, any Court 
seized at a later point in any time may suspend its proceedings103. 
Where proceedings are pending at first instance, the second court may also decline jurisdiction on 
request of a party in favor of the court first seized. This applies only if the first court has 
jurisdictions over the proceedings and if its law permits the consolidation of such related 
proceedings104. 
                                                                                                                                                            
clear, detailed and thorough  statement of reasons which justify not only the imposition of the fine 
but also the amount of  the fine». 
100 Komnios K., The general conditions for…, ep.cit.513. 
101 Article 79 
102 Article 79 para 2 
103Article 81 para 2 
104Article 81 para 3 
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2.2.4  Representations of  data subjects by Non-Profit Organizations. 
 
The new legal regime introduces two provisions regarding the representation of data subjects by 
non-profit organizations in the course of administrative or judicial proceedings.105 
 Data subjects have the right to mandate non-profit bodies, organizations and associations to lodge 
administrative complaints on their behalf, to exercise the right to a judicial remedy or bring an 
action against data controllers and processors.106 The NPOs may also claim damages on behalf of 
the data subjects should this provided for in Member State legislation.107 
The possibility of data subjects of being represented by NPOs reinforces  the rights of consumers 
given that individuals often do not have the resources to launch proceedings on their own. The 
NPOs must be properly constituted under the law of the respective Member State that is to have 
statutory objectives in the public interest, be active in the field of the protection of data subjects’ 
rights and be of non-profit making character. Furthermore, GDPR includes an opening clause for 
collective redress according to which NPOs have independent right to lodge a complaint against an 
alleged breach of individual rights should this possibility provided for by Member State law. In this 
case the consent of the data subject does not constitute a prerequisite for the commencement of 
legal proceedings by the NPO. The possibility of such abstract enforcement of rights by NPOs is 
likely to result in an increase of proceedings against companies for alleged infringements of the 
GDPR. 
 
 
                                               
105Article 80 
106Articles 77-79 
107Article 82 
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Conclusion 
 
The GDPR constitutes a strong which legal instrument which responds to current technological 
innovations and to globalization. The GDPR by adopting the model of European law on free 
competition introduces an autonomous and effective administrative fining system in order to 
consolidate the uniform application of the substantive provisions of the GDPR throughout the 
European Union. This is an important development in the scientific field of European Data 
Protection law.  A consistent application of the fining practice throughout the EU is ensured via the 
consistency mechanism. According to GDPR, administrative fines shall be effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive. The new legal framework provides for two levels of fines by which the more serious 
infringement are subject to administrative fines of up to 20 million euros or 4% of the 
organization’s total annual global turnover. The GDPR imposes fines on both controllers and 
processors. In addition, accredited certification bodies which are responsible for properly assessing 
and certifying compliance by data controllers and processors with data protection regulation and 
organizational codes of conduct, may be subject to fines for breach of their obligations. 
The concept of ‘’equivalence’’ is determinant in assessing the extent of the obligations of the 
supervisory authorities to ensure consistency in the application of administrative fines. «The high 
level of protection of natural persons and the removal of obstacles to flows of personal data within 
the Union can be safeguarded should the level of protection is equivalent in all Member States». 
The equivalent level of protection of personal data within the Union requires among others 
«equivalent powers for monitoring and ensuring compliance with the rules for the protection of 
personal data and equivalent sanctions for infringements in the Member States». 
Moreover, equivalent sanction in all Member States and effective cooperation among the 
supervisory authorities of Member States is a way «to prevent divergences hampering the free 
movement of personal data within the internal market ». 
GDPR establishes proceedings against data controllers and processors and entitle non-profit bodies 
to represent data subjects upon their consent in the course of administrative or judicial 
proceedings. In addition, includes an opening clause for collective redress that goes beyond the 
representation if Member States provide for NPO the right to lodge a complaint against an alleged 
infringement of individual rights under the GDPR. 
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The imposition of administrative fines does have legal implications to other powers of the 
supervisory authorities and the claim for damages in the sense that it does not prevent their 
exercise by substituting the latter. 
Organizations which operate as either a data controller or processor in any Member State should 
be aware of the significant increase in both the amount and scope of potential fines under the new 
legal framework. They should also ensure that are in compliance with their obligations regarding 
the appropriate technical and organizational measures and that they have implemented the 
principles of privacy by design and privacy by default. 
GDPR, through its excessive fines and the extension of the recipients of administrative sanctions, 
will be a decisive factor to the strict observance of legislation and thus the more effective 
protection of data subjects. 
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